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ABSTARCT 
The aim of this study is to analyze the political system of Iraq which emerged following the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Power-sharing (consociational) model which emphasizes the role of the 
political elites is used as the most appropriate approach in order to study post-Saddam Iraq. 
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq and despite the continuing power of insurgency and the sectarian 
violence, Iraq in fact experiencing a kind of constitutional process and political development. 
The election of January 2005, the negotiation of the constitution in the summer of that year, the 
referendum of October 15, which ratified the constitution and the second general election in mid 
December and the election of March 2010, all is a sign of functioning of political and 
constitutional development. The new constitution was written with the hope that for the diverse 
groups in Iraq to run their mutual relations in such a way that the dialogue between fighting 
parties shifts from a battle field into a political settlement. However, such political settlement, in 
spite of the huge presence of US forces, has been extremely slow. Domestic political elites have 
shown very little concern to develop the nature of consensus while dealing with the issues of 




On March 20, 2003, the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the regime 
of Saddam Hussein from power. By mid-April, major fighting was essentially over, and on May 
1, the United States declared an end to major combat operations. With that declaration, the 




and encouraging a peaceful political transition to a new and democratic Iraqi government. 
Despite the continuing power of insurgency and the sectarian violence, Iraq in fact has 
experienced a deepening constitutional process since its occupation. The election of January 
2005, the negotiation of the constitution in the summer of that year, the referendum of October 
15, which ratified the constitution and the second general election in mid December, all is a sign 
of functioning of political and constitutional development. However, there are many issues that 
have been repeatedly analyzed by those wishing to determine or predict the identity of the future 
of Iraqi state, such as competing models of federalism, the relationship between Islam and state, 
the way of distributing oil revenue and the status of Kerkuk .The new constitution was written 
with the  hope that for the diverse groups in Iraq to run their mutual relations in such a way that 
the dialogue between fighting parties shifts from a battle field into a political settlement . 
However, such political settlement, in spite of the huge presence of US forces, has been 
extremely slow. Domestic political elites have shown very little concern to develop the nature of 
consensus while dealing with the issues of crucial importance for Iraq and its citizens.  
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the US and its allies behave authoritatively violating all 
premises of democracy, their presence in the country is now becoming essential for the country’s 
further political development and democratic consolidation.   
 
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY (POWER-SHARING DEMOCRACY) 
The consociational model was developed through the expansion of Almond’s model of political 
systems in order to explain the existence of fragmented but politically stable democracies. 




political systems (Britain and the United States), Continental European systems (France, 
Germany and Italy) and a third category consisting of the Scandinavian and Low Countries 
(Switzerland and Austria). The first type of political systems is characterized by "a homogenous, 
secular political culture" and a high degree of political stability contrasted with the fragmented 
political culture and low degree of political stability of the other two systems.1 However, despite 
being ‘highly differentiated’ and containing a fragmented political culture, these systems still 
enjoyed political stability. Lijphart terms any of these deviant cases of fragmented but stable 
democracies as “consociational democracy.”2 
Arend Lijphart whose works on the politics of accommodation are considered as 
milestones in the development of consociational democracy. Lijphart authored the book The 
Politics of Accommodation3 in which he analyzed the Dutch political system. In the same year, 
he wrote the first explicitly comparative analysis of consociationalism, which became the first 
article in the new journal Comparative Political Studies.4  
However, Lijphart fully developed and elaborated the concept and according to him 
consociational democracy can be defined in terms of four characteristics:  
1. Government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of 
the plural society. This means that the government includes representatives from all 
relevant groups in society in the form either of a great coalition among the main 
                                                            
1 Gabriel A. Almond, “Comparative Political Systems, ” Journal of Politics, August 1956, Vol.18, No.3, pp.392-93, 
405. 
2 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy, ” World Politics, January 1969, Vol.21, No.2, pp. 207-225. The term 
“consociational” was used by David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic 
Nationalism, Princeton, 1961, pp.651-52.  
3 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968. 





parties, of all-party government or of temporary round tables. In each case it will be 
decisive to secure “the participation by the leaders of all significant segments.”5 
2. The mutual veto which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests. 
This means that each group has the opportunity to block political decisions by using 
its veto rights. The primary aim of this is to foster consensus-building and the search 
for compromise. The right to veto can apply unrestrictedly to all decisions (absolute 
veto), it can be conditional and just refer to some basic laws or it can just have a 
delaying effect in order to renegotiate disputed issues.6 
3. Proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service 
appointments and the allocation of public funds. It indicates that all groups or 
segments are adequately represented within the executive, the parliament, the legal 
system and the public service. This can be assured through a quota system according 
to the size of the groups, the number of voters or a fixed ratio.  
4. A high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs. Here, 
each group enjoys some degree of self-government; it maintains its own elected 
bodies, institutions and competencies. Therefore, few issues only have to be 
coordinated with another segment of society. Usually, this is organized on the basis 
of territorial arrangements. It implies that consociationalism will coincide with a 
federal-type structure that is characterized by “a society in which each segment is 
territorially concentrated and separated from the other segments, or, to put it 
differently, a society in which the segmental cleavages coincide with regional 
cleavages.  
                                                            
5 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 
p.31. 




CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF CONSOCIATIONALISM IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ 
Examination of Iraq's constitution suggests that consociationalism, as Lijphart envisioned it, was 
attempted. Based on an evaluation of the constitution's for a regional autonomy, a grand coalition 
government, mutual veto rights and proportionality, it appears that the constitution did contain 
some consociational provisions. Specifically, the constitution did contain federal provisions 
aimed at providing autonomy to Kurdish, Sunni and Shi'a communities.7 However, while this 
complies with consociationalism's autonomy goals, it does so while alienating Sunnis, who 
favored a decentralized Iraq instead of federal regions. While providing this degree of self-
sufficiency may have been ideal, opting for such federation given the Sunni's intense opposition 
to it may have actually undermined consociationalism's chances for success. 8 Nevertheless, 
these efforts to accommodate the needs of both communities demonstrate the constitution's 
inclusion of an important component of consociationalism. The constitution outlines that all 
powers not exclusively reserved for the federal government "shall be the powers of the regions, 
’9 and also protects the rights of regions to oversee regional educational institutions and security 
forces. Such delegation of governmental power represents the commitment to regional autonomy 
                                                            
7 Articles 113-122 of the Iraqi Constitution recognize a balance of power between the the federal 
government and the provinces of Iraq, although they leave many details to be determined by the 
Council of Representatives. See, Nathan Brown, "The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and 
Commentary, " Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2005) <http: 
//www.camegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftSeptI6.pdf>. 
8 Sunnis feared that federalism would lead to Iraq's dissolution and instead preferred decentralization,  
which allowed for provincial autonomy but did not allow provinces to have individual constitutions and 
border guards. 
9 Iraq Constitution. United Nations. Retrieved January 15, 2007 from 




that consociationalism requires while paradoxically simultaneously intensifying tensions 
between religious sects. 
The constitution also allows for a grand coalition of governing elites, in accordance with 
Lijphart's criteria. Article 62 creates a Federation Council, a legislative body that will "include 
representatives from the regions and the governorates that are not organized in a region. A law, 
enacted by a two-third majority of the member of the Council of Representatives, shall regulate 
the Federation Council formation.10 While the specific regulations about membership and 
function this council were not explicitly outlined in the constitution, this reflected a concrete 
attempt to create a coalition style governing body. This Federation Council would be one of two 
legislative bodies (the other is the Council of Representatives), and while it was clearly intended 
as a lawmaking body, its authority is undefined.11 The constitution's creation of the Federation 
Council demonstrates a clear attempt to comply with consociationalism's doctrines. Conversely, 
the Shi'a-dominated drafting committee's preference for majoritarianism limited the 
constitution's consociational aspects because the majority's views impinged upon the principle of 
mutual veto rights and did not require minority consent in order to pass bills. Shi'a comprised a 
majority of the constitutional committee and are a majority in Iraq, and as such, the constitution's 
provisions allowed for majority rule to some extent. These majoritarian principles would clearly 
benefit the Shi'a majority. This is evident in "a major feature in the new Constitution is the shift 
from consociational to majoritarian rule, 12 The previous three person Presidency allowed for 
                                                            
10 Iraq Constitution. United Nations. Retrieved January 15, 2007 from http: 
//porta1.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/11332732681 iraqtconstitution_en.pdf/iraqi_constitution_en.pdf. 
11 CIA. "Iraq." The World Factbook (2007) https: //www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbooklgeos/ 
iz.html. 




Sunni, Shi'a and Kurdish leaders to veto actions or laws that they perceived as detrimental to 
their constituencies, but under the new constitution this was no longer allowed. As such, Iraq's 
constitution does not meet Lijphart's criteria for mutual veto rights. Despite the majoritarian 
aspects of the ceremonial presidency, other aspects of Iraq's constitution reflect Lijphart's 
principle of proportionality. Specifically, the constitutional provisions mandate "fair distribution 
of grants, aid, and international loans, , 26 and the establishment of a public commission 
composed of federal regions, governorates and parts of Iraq not established in a region, 13 but do 
not outline how these goals will be accomplished. Given Sunni opposition to, and Kurdish 
preference for, a federalized Iraq, this lack of clarity could result in the implementation of laws 
that would alienate either community. While consensus on this issue would have been difficult to 
reach in the hasty drafting process, a clear understanding of the nature of this proportionality and 
the role of federal regions could have prevented future conflict. Furthermore, it could have 
allowed for all parties, instead of just those in power at the time of the provision's 
implementation to guide the law's direction.  
However, despite the lack of clarity of the laws outlining proportionality, other aspects of 
the Iraqi constitution produced a system of proportional representation. Though the constitution 
"gives little guidance on how an election law should be Written, 14 the resulting electoral laws 
were proportional.15 Currently, the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) oversees 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
International, 2005. http: //www.minorityrights.org/adminidownloadlpd£'IraqMicro2005.pdf. 
13 Iraq Constitution. United Nations. Retrieved January 15, 2007 from 
<http://portal.unesco.orglci/en/files/20704/11332732681iraqi_constitution_en.pdf/iraqi_constitution_en.pdf>. 
14 Nathan Brown. "The Final Draft ofthe Iraqi Constitution: Analysis and Commentary." Carnegie 
Endowment/or International Peace, (2005),  
<http: //www.camegieendowment.orgifiles/FinalDraftSept16.pdf>. 
15 The electoral system is not a part of the Iraqi Constitution, but the Constitution stipulates that any election 
should provide for the “ representation of all components of the Iraqi people, ” which suggests a proportional 




elections. The IECI describes the Iraqi electoral process as "mainly a governorate based system 
[where] 230 seats are appointed among the 18 governorates in proportion to the number of 
persons registered to vote.16 The IECI asserts that this process is "part of a larger family of 
proportional representation”17 systems which establish that the IECl's laws mirror those of other 
countries with Proportional Representation. This directly corresponds with Lijphart's principle of 
proportionality. Such a system prioritizes representation of the diverse communities of a nation. 
Additionally, the IECI reserves 45 seats to allocate to non-elected representatives. Some of these 
seats will go to political parties that do not gain any seats but still earn at least 1/275 (the 
established threshold) of the total votes cast in the national election. The IECI allocates other 
seats to reward parties that won a majority of votes both in governorates and nationwide. This 
election law and its outlined plan for proportional representation complies with consociational 
principles, and demonstrates an additional way in which Iraq attempted consociationalism. 
Though the electoral system was not explicitly outlined in the constitution, the resulting 
legislation was proportional. As such, the constitution complied with Lijphart's criteria for 
consociational governments through its emphasis on regional autonomy and a grand coalition of 
governing elites. Though lacking in provisions protecting minority veto rights, Iraq's constitution 
prioritizes Lijphart's principles of consociational governments through articles that resulted in 
proportional representation electoral laws and proportional distribution of government resources. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
women — which obliges a proportional representation system because single-gender districts or constituencies 
would violate the constitutional mandate for equality between the sexes. IRAQ CONST. art. 49. Any electoral 
system that is not based on proportional representation, such as the single-member plurality or alternative-vote 
systems that are favored by integrationists, would have the effect of under-representing minorities, particularly 
small minorities, and could be subject to court challenges. 






While minority veto rights could be strengthened, Iraq's constitution mostly complies with the 
framework of Lijphart's consociational theory. Given Iraq's consociational constitution, by 
Lijphart's logic it should have resulted in peaceful power-sharing and diminished ethnic tensions. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The lack of accommodative and consensual political elites has characterized post-Saddam era, 
the country has been politically unstable. It has to be said that the country’s progress has been 
slow; its institutions are functioning but have yet to become truly effective and self-sustaining. 
This has been possible due to the huge and strong presence of the U.S. forces who have 
sweeping powers to remove those officials who hinder the full implementation of the Iraqi 
constitution, makes binding decisions and pass the laws that domestic political elites are not able 
to agree upon. However, the state building under foreign occupation or for U.S. to build and 
stabilize the Iraq state and its institutions has not been finished yet. 
As a result of this, Iraq can be considered as an artificial state unable to function and keep 
going without strong external factors. Furthermore, in such artificial cases the conventional 
definition of political instability is not applicable and a new one has to be deduced. Political 
stability in such cases has to be measured in terms of jointly taken decisions by the domestic 
elites.          
The present structure of the state and its decision-making procedures suffer from the same 
deficiency as the monarchy period; the alleged multi-ethnic tradition in Iraq is not a solid ground 
for building a new, modern and democratic society. The population is divided and has 




long-term solution. As a result of that, the present solutions have not made any significant 
progress in order to strengthen the central Iraq’s institutions. 
The politics of accommodation is greatly slowed down , when the cleavages are mutually 
reinforcing rather than crosscutting one another, ethnic groups are represented by many small 
political parties, there is an imbalance between various subcultures and the model that has to be 
applied for a country to function is imposed from outside without taking into consideration the 
country’s domestic milieu. In the absence of these favorable conditions and presence of some 
factors that only further aggravated the situation, the prospects for a stable political system and 
its normal functioning are extremely poor. The ultimate cure for institutional instability in Iraq 
lies perhaps in the modification of the behavior of the country’s political elites. 
 
